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Accession to the European Union: Civil
Society in Democratizing Turkey
Michaela Solo
Civil society is a space in which the state and society interact through voluntary citizen 
participation in organizations representing a myriad of interests, purposes and values. Since 
Turkey was accepted as a candidate for membership to the European Union, Turkish civil 
society has been both an active actor in the process of accession and an object for examining 
the status of the political, economic, social and cultural transformation necessary for Turkey 
to achieve membership. While civil society is not one of the thirty-five chapters of the acquis 
communautaire, or total body of EU law, that Turkey must successfully complete negotiations 
with the European Commission to accede to the EU, its ongoing development is vital for 
diffusing support and information related to Europeanization. The purpose of this research 
paper is to look at the question to what extent has civil society been a mechanism for de-
mocratization throughout Turkey’s bid for membership to the European Union? Examin-
ing the role of bottom-up initiative, its relationship to other internal agents and interactions 
with external forces is important for determining the opportunities for improvement and 
prospects for becoming a member of the EU. While Turkey’s accession is a major contro-
versy and Turkish culture is believed to not fit with European values, one norm European 
Union members can identify with is building an efficient civil society to create a space for 
trust in democracy. 
The concept of civil society is complex and there is little consensus on its defini-
tion. It also has different names such as third-sector actors, voluntary organizations and 
non-governmental organizations. The European Economic and Social Committee’s (1999) 
definition is useful for understanding how comprehensive civil society is: “Civil society or-
ganizations can be defined in abstract terms as the sum of all organizational structures whose 
members have objectives and responsibilities that are of general interest and who also act as 
mediators between the public authorities and citizens.” Civil society includes trade unions 
and employers organizations, organizations representing social and economic players, non-
governmental organizations which bring people together in common cause, human rights 
organizations, registered charities, professional associations, grassroots organizations, reli-
gious communities, youth organizations, family associations and all organizations through 
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which citizens participate in local and municipal life. 
Civil society and democracy in Turkey
Turkey’s civil society has traditionally been portrayed as weak, passive, and controlled 
or channeled by the state through corporatist structures (Kubicek, 2005). The bureaucratic-
authoritarian nature of the Turkish republic and a long era of slow political development 
left Turkish civil society organizations (CSOs) dilapidated and “generally unable to solve 
their own problems, let alone being able to help the process of Turkey’s democratization” 
(Arabaci, 2008, p. 77). The Turkish public had been depoliticized by the power of the 
military and as a result, was indifferent to CSOs or even clashed ideologically. As citizens, 
they expected benefits from the state and did not put anything back. This comes from the 
political culture that inherited the concept of the devlet baba, or “father-state” being an all-
powerful organization that solves society’s problems. 
Democracy in Turkey has also been regarded as having deficits: “If a democracy is 
viewed as a system in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competi-
tive struggle for the people’s vote, then Turkey qualifies as a democracy. However, this is a 
minimalist definition, and many would contend that democracies depend upon other factors 
in order to function and be consolidated” (Kubicek, 2002, p. 2). These factors that Turkey’s 
minimalist democracy has had difficulties with include a restrained military, protection of 
fundamental rights and freedoms, rule of law, measures of accountability, public support for 
democratic values and institutions, and civil society. 
The problems with Turkish democracy, along with its economic situation, poor rela-
tions with Greece, and other differences, is why the EU predecessor, the European Com-
munity, refused to accept Turkey’s 1987 application for formal membership in 1989. Again, 
in 1997, the European Commission report, Agenda 2000 “declared that Turkey was far 
from being a candidate state” (LaGro and Jorhensen, 2007, p.7) Finally, since the European 
Council recognized Turkey as a candidate for membership at the Helsinki Summit in 1999, 
“Turkish state and society have been transformed by a political avalanche of democratiza-
tion” (Kubicek, 2005, p. 363).
The general consensus is that Turkey’s democracy and civil society has both come a 
long way and has a long way to go. Since civil society goes hand-in-hand with democratiza-
tion, further examination of the role Turkey’s civil society has played in democratization in-
ternally is necessary to see how credible Turkey’s candidacy is in fitting into the EU’s crite-
ria for membership. Additionally, influences to the extent of democratization in the Turkish 
experience such as civil society’s history in Turkey, its relationship to the European Union, 
the case of the Turkish Industrialists’ and Businessmen Association (TUSIAD), Islamic orga-
nizations and women’s associations provide a view of prospects for Turkey’s future.
Milestones for Turkey’s civil society 
Turkey is the only democratic secular state among the Muslim countries with a dy-
namic civil society (Sener, 2009). However, the Turkish Republic inherited from its pre-
decessor, the Ottoman Empire, a strong state tradition that has created obstacles for free 
association. The dominant center dating back to the Ottoman Empire has been continually 
suspicious about civil society. Despite this tradition, civil society and NGOs began to rise 
in Turkey as a consequence of the transition to the multiparty system in 1946. This major 
step toward democratization influenced civil society as well. Although the period between 
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1950 and 1980 was tumultuous since it included three coups, the number of associations had 
exceeded 17,000 by 1960, over eight times the amount of organizations in 1945. The final 
military rule in 1980 especially impeded the development of civic culture because it tried 
to de-politicize society and shift the political attitudes of citizens to prevent political polar-
ization and fragmentation. Furthermore, the 1982 Constitution restricted the formation of 
CSOs by complicating the legal basis for their existence. 
Despite this, opposition from Europe to the military intervention gave leeway for the 
importance of civil society to increase. The end of the Cold War “also had important reper-
cussions on discussions of civil society, as elsewhere, because this disintegration showed that 
strong state with a command economy neither provides material wealth nor freedom for 
citizens”(Sener, p. 3). The 1990s and era of globalization had a profound effect on Turkey’s 
democracy and civil society because liberalization and individualism expanded. In 1993, the 
law banning private radio and television stations was eliminated and the subsequent growth 
of the media has been important in the sense that the media makes government and civil 
service more transparent and accountable to citizens. 
The 1990s also included crucial milestones for civil society such as the Marmara Earth-
quake and the Helsinki Summit. The natural and political disaster of the earthquake broke 
the traditional image of the state because CSOs and citizens filled the void of the govern-
ment by effectively uniting to provide necessary services and disaster relief. Groups that 
organized, including the Civil Coordination Center and the Search and Rescue Association, 
“became media stars, and their heroics stood in stark contrast to the performance of state 
organs” (Kubicek, 2002, p. 38). The other milestone in December of 1999, when Turkey 
was accepted as a candidate for membership at the Helsinki Summit, gave Turkey’s CSOs 
and democracy a partnership with the EU that has resulted in an avalanche of change. The 
EU also serves as an external force of pressure on the Turkish government to introduce this 
change: “However, this pressure creates something of a paradox in the strong-state tradition 
in Turkey. This is because the Turkish political elite perceives EU as a badge of modernity 
and civilization but does not necessarily see membership as entailing the construction of 
a fully democratic and liberal society” (Keyman and Icduygu, 2005, p. 98). Turkish civil 
society, on the other hand, has the opposite effect of the Turkish political elite. While the 
politicians see EU membership as “a badge of modernity,” the civil society that has flour-
ished in Turkey is a badge of modernity in itself because it has adopted the modern concept 
into civic life against difficult odds. While the government has been a “reluctant democra-
tizer” (Kubicek, 2005, p. 362), Turkish CSOs have filled that void by providing the support 
from below that is essential for consolidating reform. CSOs have been leaders in grassroots 
democratization in part by utilizing EU resources and interacting with EU institutions.
The EU and Turkey’s civil society
As a result of Turkey’s candidacy for membership to the European Union, the gov-
ernment advanced a National Program for the Adoption of the Acquis in 2000 and nine 
subsequent reform, or “harmonization” packages by the end of 2004. Before the Helsinki 
Summit, reform efforts had been superficial, but after the EU gave Turkey the token of 
candidacy and the prospect of membership and “modernity,” substantial reforms occurred. 
Reforms that were specifically relevant for civil society as an object include narrowing 
the basis for which the state could restrict the freedom of rights and liberties, more liberal 
provisions for freedom of assembly, and a new Associations Law. The Associations Law 
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eliminated previous restrictions on who could establish an association, types of associations 
such as those on the basis of race, ethnicity, or minority group, signs and slogans associations 
could use, and having relations with foreign organizations.   
The reforms went far enough for the EU to open accession talks in December of 2004. 
The European Commission recommended a three-pillar strategy on Turkey’s progress in-
cluding fulfilling the Copenhagen Criteria, implementing the acquis communautaire, and 
building a dialogue to bring together EU member states and Turkey. The EU has made a 
real effort to engage CSOs in order to achieve these goals. As citizens of a candidate country, 
Turks can apply to a number of EU programs for grants, exchanges, and training. The NGO 
sector is in close contact with their counterparts in Brussels, the de facto capital of the EU, 
and member state capitals. The EU gave over 3 billion euro in assistance between 2000 and 
2006 to be used for institution-building, regional development, and investment in regulato-
ry infrastructure. CSOs can play a role in “supporting initiatives aimed at the consolidation 
and further development of democratic practices, the rule of law, human rights, equality for 
women and men and the protection of minorities” (Kubicek, 2005, p. 368). The EU’s Civil 
Society Development Program helps get Turkish CSOs involved in seminars, conferences, 
and partnerships with Europeans. It also oversees programs in Greek-Turkish civic dialogue, 
trade union dialogue, police professionalism, and local civic initiatives.    
This external support has been especially important in spreading knowledge about the 
EU, getting local groups to be more active, and influencing elites to be more open to con-
troversial measures such as Kurdish, women’s, and human rights. The EU membership goal 
has also eased the fragmentation between groups. The EU has been a powerful agent for 
change to Turkey’s democracy and civil society, but this is not an entirely externally driven 
process. Support from below is essential for reform and it is the role of the internal agents, 
such as CSOs, to ease the implementation problems that go along with this externally in-
duced democratization process.
TUSIAD
The Turkish Industrialists and Businessmen’s Association (TUSIAD) is a voluntary 
interest association representing big business and large conglomerates in Turkey. TUSIAD 
has been described as “the most vocal force within civil society and possibly the polity 
at large to push in the direction of the extension of civil and human rights as well as the 
establishment of a transparent and accountable state” (Turkmen, p. 152) and “very differ-
ent from other NGOs in Turkey in terms of the social diplomacy it conducts alongside 
the official diplomacy of the government.” (Sener, p. 4) The engagement of TUSIAD in 
the country’s democratization challenges traditional views that businessmen are typically 
interested in stability: “Whenever considerations relating to stability come into conflict 
with political pluralism and democratic, they tend to swing in the direction of authoritarian 
solutions.” (Onis and Turem, 2002, p. 439) TUSIAD, on the other hand, has been actively 
pro-democratization in order to defend its own interests and express a collective concern 
about the social, economic, and political problems of Turkey as a whole.
Businessmen and industrialists established TUSIAD in 1971 after the ’71 coup as a 
response to Turkey’s severe economic and political problem at the time. The strong cen-
tralized state tradition inherited by the Ottoman Empire meant that the state dominated 
over business in the economy. TUSIAD challenged this ideology and was inspired by the 
structure of Western countries. Throughout the 1970s TUSIAD’s primary focus was on 
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economic considerations and providing solutions to the economic problems of the state. 
During the 1980s, TUSIAD reacted to the 1980-1983 military government and subsequent 
regime of restricted democracy by harshly criticizing the government’s economic policies. 
In the course of TUSIAD’s first decades, the organization’s actions and publications were 
almost exclusively on economic issues. The 1990s represented a distinct departure from the 
70s and 80s by making an explicit agenda for democratization the focal point of its activities. 
The 1990s provided two anchors for the shift in TUSIAD’s interests: globalization and 
the European Union. Globalization helped to shape TUSIAD’s vision because members had 
a growing belief that the economic benefits of globalization would be available on a large 
scale only if democratic norms were fully applied in the political sphere (Onis and Turem, p. 
444). Also during the time, the EU was increasingly emphasizing the conditions for mem-
bership including democracy and human rights. Additionally, as firms internationalized, 
TUSIAD wanted to legitimize business from the state intervention that is so much a part of 
Turkey’s political tradition. TUSIAD was dedicated to checking the power of the state and 
rendering it more accountable and transparent. TUSIAD was creating a good public image 
for itself both domestically and on a global level. 
One way in which TUSIAD highlighted democratic deficiencies of the state was by 
commissioning reports. Its first such publication was the 1997 volume entitled “Perspec-
tives on Democratization in Turkey.” The report touched on Turkey’s most controversial 
issues including freedom of expression, Kurdish cultural and language rights, the need to 
institute civilian control over the military, and state-civil society relations. The document 
caused considerable uproar and profoundly impacted public opinion. In response to the de-
bate concerning the initial report, TUSIAD released a follow-up in 1999, which continued 
tackling the problematic aspects of Turkish democracy, especially human rights and civil-
military relations. After the EU accepted Turkey as a candidate for membership, TUSIAD 
released another set of reports in May, June, and September of 2001 called “Perspectives on 
Democratization in Turkey and the EU Copenhagen Criteria.”   
TUSIAD has put considerable effort into developing a partnership with the EU and 
lobbying for Turkey in Brussels and in EU member states. In 1999, prior to the Helsinki 
Summit, TUSIAD visited eleven member countries campaigning for Turkey’s candidacy. 
Similarly, in preparation for meetings in Copenhagen in 2002 and Brussels in 2004, TUSI-
AD met with ministers and heads of state of almost all of the EU member states. TUSIAD’s 
interests are represented on the EU level because it is a part of organizations such as the 
Union of Industrial and Employers’ Confederations of Europe, Union of Mediterranean 
Confederations of Enterprises, and Organization for Economic Cooperation and Develop-
ment. TUSIAD has several working groups, each in charge of different chapters of the EU 
acquis. TUSIAD also holds several meetings abroad. One such meeting was held in 2006 at 
the European Parliament and focused on women’s rights in Turkey.
TUSIAD takes a leading role in acting as an intermediary between Turkish citizens and 
the government. It closely monitors executive and legislative processes in the government 
and parliament. TUSIAD’s working groups publicize its position on draft laws. It lobbies 
for effective communication channels in the bureaucracy. TUSIAD pressures the govern-
ment and informs the public by utilizing the media. TUSIAD allies itself with academics, 
researchers, and experts in the issues its takes on. With its international linkages, well-publi-
cized research, and effective lobbying, TUSIAD is carrying out the crucial function of social 
diplomacy, which provides transparency to the official diplomacy to the state.
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Islamic organizations
Just as TUSIAD challenges traditional views that business associations achieve stability 
by encouraging authoritarian regimes, Islamic organizations in Turkey challenge the argu-
ment that Islam and democracy inherently conflict. One of the chief concerns among EU 
member states is that Turkey clashes with European norms because it is too Islamic. How-
ever, one possible antidote to Europe’s increasing Islamophobia is that “Turkey stands as the 
forerunner within the Islamic world in the encounter with modernity and modern political 
paradigms such as democracy” (Ozler and Ergun, 2008, p. 88) Turkey has considerable 
work ahead of it in fulfilling the criteria to become a member state of the EU, but Turkey’s 
uniqueness in the Arab world for its more dynamic democracy and civil society potentially 
serves as a good foreign policy decision for the EU if Europeans let it. Islamic CSOs are 
helping the accession process by showing that Islam and democracy can exist in harmony 
and adapting to a modern idea of effective third sector actors.
In the 1990s, when “Turkish civil society became more visible and vocal, often de-
manding greater political liberalization, Islamic organizations took the lead in inserting 
themselves into the political life of the country” (Kubicek, 2005, p. 367) Islamic groups also 
got considerable attention because they participated in disaster relief when the state proved 
incapable of mobilizing quickly enough. Although Islamic groups had difficulties with re-
strictions set by the state after it regained some control since the earthquake, the rise of the 
Justice and Development Party (AKP) to power in the 2002 elections has given Islamic 
groups, as well as CSOs in general, more leeway to interact between the state and citizens.
Islamic NGOs work to provide goods and services to the poor, emphasize shortcom-
ings of the state to combat poverty, and lobby on issues such as public services and social 
policies. Islamic thinking and tradition support NGOs as service providers and virtuous 
groups that help the needy. Deniz Feneri Derneği (The Light House) Association is a 
powerful Islamic charitable group that has ongoing projects in the areas of food, education, 
health and shelter and guest houses, public soup-kitchens and free clothing stores and oc-
cupational courses. Smaller and regional organizations promote development on a local level 
and in areas outside of cities that have had less contact with civil society.
These charitable activities increase democratic participation in a context that is familiar 
to their traditions. Other Islamic groups, including human rights and business associations, 
are increasing in quantity and sophistication, which may be unexpected for proponents of 
the argument that Islam is inherently in conflict with democracy and liberal economics. The 
Association of Human Rights and Solidarity for the Oppressed (MAZLUMDER) is a CSO 
that takes reference from the “Alliance of Virtuous” which had the Prophet Mohammed as 
one of its members and required that the oppressed should be supported no matter who he 
is and the oppressor should be stood against no matter who he is. In addition to this, MA-
ZLUMDER positions its struggle for human rights and freedoms in line with contributions 
such as the Ten Commandments, Magna Carta, the French Declaration of the Rights of 
Man and of Citizen, the UN Declaration of Human Rights, and the European Convention 
on Human Rights. MAZLUMDER allies itself with international human rights NGOs to 
hold meetings, fact collect, write reports, and hold campaigns for human rights issues in 
Turkey and internationally. The work of MAZLUMDER diffuses knowledge about the 
concept of human rights and the EU’s criteria for human rights.
MUSIAD (The Association of Independent Industrialists and Businessmen), an Islam-
ic-oriented business association, is a pro-EU membership group. It supports the compat-
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ibility of EU membership as well as the Islamic-democratic character of Turkey in order 
to convince the Turkish state to perceive religious rights as an extension of democracy and 
individual rights, while benefiting from EU resources and trade opportunities within the 
European market (Onis, 2004, p. 450). This stance also spreads support and information 
about the EU and prospects for Turkey’s democracy.
Women’s Associations
Women’s organizations are defined as groups whose founders and beneficiaries are 
women. These associations represent indicators for how the politics of gender are taking 
shape and are actors for improving the well being of women. Women’s groups in Turkey 
have grown tremendously since the 1980s and they represent a diverse set of goals, but three 
general categories of associations are Islamist, Kemalist, and Feminist (Esim and Cindoglu, 
1999).   
Similar to the Islamic groups discussed above, many women’s organizations are based 
on religious values. Islamic family and women’s associations are common on the local level 
and they provide financial help to those in need, scholarships to students, organize semi-
nars, and other services. Umbrella institutions, such as IKADDER, which brings togeth-
er Islamic women’s associations, have increased communication between smaller groups. 
These charitable activities increase democratic participation in a context that is familiar 
to their traditions. Another women’s Islamist association is Women Rights Organization 
Against Discrimination, or Ayrimciliga Karsi Kadin Hareketi (AKDER). Women who were 
discriminated against as students and professionals founded AKDER in 1999. While the 
women of AKDER support improving women’s rights generally, their main focus and only 
major publication is on the headscarf issue, which is a state ban on wearing head attire in 
universities and other public institutions (Kadioglu, 2005). Although there continues to be a 
perceived conflict between Islam and women’s rights, this group and others support solidar-
ity and action within the public sphere.
Kemalist organizations mostly pursue nationalist and secular agendas. One longstand-
ing group, Turkish Women’s Union (Turk Kadinlar Birligi), was founded in 1924 to obtain 
active participation in political and social life. Like many other Kemalist organizations, 
the Turkish Women’s Union provides poverty alleviation, health services, family planning 
counseling, and education opportunities. One crucial function of the Turkish Women’s 
Union and other organizations is campaigning for the election of women to the parliament 
known as the Grand National Assembly. In the 2007 election, the proportion of women in 
parliament grew from 4.2% to 9.1%. This remains a small minority of women, especially in 
comparison to other nations, but considering Turkey’s political and religious culture, this 
is a significant shift. With a small number of female elected officials, the role of women’s 
CSOs has been crucial for ensuring more substantive representation that addresses gender 
inequality: “Women in the Turkish parliament, together with a strong women’s movement 
as the voice of feminist perspectives, were critical actors in the substantive representation of 
women. […] In the absence of high women’s presence in the legislature, a strong women’s 
movement sought alternative ways of making politics work for women and enhance the 
democratic climate” (Gunes, 2008, 474). Although the female elected officials come from 
different parties, they often join together to address gender inequalities in Turkey. 
Feminist groups deal with gender needs by working on subjects such as domestic 
violence, discrimination, legal reform, women’s empowerment, and raising awareness. One 
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association that addresses these issues is the Purple Roof Women’s Shelter (Mor Cati Kadin 
Siginiagi). Purple Roof provides victims of domestic violence with refuge, therapy, and 
programs to help the women gain independence. Similarly, the Foundation to Support 
Women’s Work (Kadin Emegini Degerlendirme Vakfi) assists women in gaining autonomy 
by providing employment services and quality childcare while they are working. These 
organizations, although there are not that many of them, make women’s needs a priority 
in a traditional culture that discourages and is suspicious of feminist values. However, since 
women’s rights are a crucial part of fulfilling requirements for accession, these feminist or-
ganizations, as well as the other women’s associations within the country, instead of exter-
nally induced from the EU and pressured from the West, serve Turkey in achieving a more 
equitable democracy. 
Conclusion 
Turkish civil society is both an object in the process of democratization and an actor 
in advancing democracy. Turkey’s CSOs experienced changes due to internal and external 
milestones. The Maramara Earthquake in 1999 was a political disaster for Turkey’s govern-
ment because it was unable to mobilize effectively. CSOs and Turkish citizens successfully 
worked together to provide disaster relief and got considerable attention for their services. 
The Helsinki Summit in 1999 was an external force, which gave Turkey the candidacy and 
began the successful application of political conditionality necessary for reform. For civil 
society, the Helsinki Summit started the effort of the EU to engage Turkish NGOs by of-
fering resources and increasing dialogue between civic organizations and the Turkish state.
TUSIAD the business association, Islamic groups, and women’s organizations are three 
cases in which Turkish CSOs have contributed to democratization. TUSIAD is one of the 
most salient and effective proponents of democratization, increasing rights, and joining the 
European Union. Islamic groups provide services that the state does not always deliver such 
as poverty alleviation and development. Islamic groups also get citizens to be involved lo-
cally and outside of urban areas. Women’s associations represent the diversity of women’s 
values, increase action to ensure more equality, and contribute to substantive representation 
in government. CSOs are crucial to democratization because they increase participation 
and getting informed about democracy. In Turkey’s case, while there is majority support 
for joining the EU, many do not have knowledge about what the EU is and the changes 
Turkey must make. Civil society spreads information and opens the door to communication 
between Brussels, EU member states, and Turkish organizations. Also, increasingly dynamic 
civil society unpacks Turkey’s strong-state tradition through decentralization. While the EU 
should hold Turkey to the highest standards for fulfilling accession criteria and the Turkish 
government must be more active in making significant reforms, continuing to support civil 
society externally and internally is surely a positive way to increase security and democracy 
for Turkey and the EU alike.  
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